Books about ethical decisionmaking. According to Dewey, ethical questions arise when we find ourselves in a problematic situation in which we simply do not know what to do and in which our decisions affect the well-being of others. Contrary to traditional ethical theory, Dewey argued that moral principles are provisional hypotheses regarding what is valuable and cannot be applied in an algorithmic manner. For example, the content of principles crucially depends on the circumstance in which these principles are applied. Dewey provides a procedural view of ethical decisionmaking: The right action is the one that intelligent participants would choose as the most reasonable option after discussion and evaluation of the alternatives. Dewey's pragmatic ethics is pluralistic, since it reflects a variety of values; it is context dependent, since no moral principle is always relevant; and it is naturalistic, since it does not require knowledge of divine will or transcendent truths.
What gives this book particular relevance is Minteer's articulation of how environmental pragmatism can be applied to twenty-first-century environmental issues. First, he argues on the basis of empirical fieldwork that stakeholders value the environment for a multiplicity of economic, recreational, aesthetic, and religious reasons, which are sensitive to different management contexts. True enough, some of these reasons are anthropocentric, but they are one group of values among many. Second, environmental pragmatism revives the notion of the public interest and uses tools such as dispute negotiation as a model of how environmental ethical reasoning can be made effective. Third, Minteer explicitly addresses the importance of what he calls ecological ethicshow biologists should make decisions humble beginnings, environmental ethicists have controversially argued that plants, populations, species, and even ecosystems have interests that can be furthered or thwarted. As such, these interests must have moral standing and deserve moral consideration.
The early environmental ethicists were motivated by their objection to anthropocentrism, but they were also influenced by the various countercultural movements of the 1960s and 1970s. In their view, modern philosophers should not merely grapple with the abstract, metaethical questions but should also provide relevant guidance regarding current issues of race, gender, class, and the environment. However, what is striking about this area of applied ethics is just how theoretical it has been. The question Does nonhuman nature have intrinsic value? has been at the core of this field, yet answering this question has become tantamount to addressing the objective or subjective nature of values. Therefore, in pursuit of a distinctive nonanthropocentric ethical theory, environmental ethicists have consequently less and less to say about pressing environmental problems.
In light of this predicament, Minteer urges philosophers to "refound" environmental ethics on pragmatic footing. Specifically, he urges that we follow John Dewey's lead when thinking Early in the book, Feduccia tells us that the most important issues are "whether birds are living theropods and whether flight evolved from the ground up rather than from trees down" (p. 23). However, for most researchers, and presumably for this audience, the more important questions are Who are the closest relatives of birds? and How did these animals evolve flight? This difference in scope sets the book's entire tone, because Feduccia is clearly more interested in disproving the theropod hypothesis than in providing support for an alternative.
We learn soon enough about the author's methodological strategy: "The possibility that one key synapomorphy, if falsified, would reduce all the other synapomorphies to the status of parallelism and hence irrelevant to the debate, should be a lesson to the more dogmatic cladists" (p. 21). This and other statements reveal Feduccia's precarious understanding of the methodology he so despises. Astonishingly, he argues that "cladistic approaches tend to group animals as ecological equivalents (ecomorphs) without any necessary regard to actual relatedness" and emphasizes that the "overarching problem in cladistic approaches has let you get away with " (1979, p. 176 In summary, Refounding Environmental Ethics is readable, and Minteer's challenge to his readers is important. He clearly identifies substantial problems in the way that environmental ethics is practiced, and he presents a powerful and pragmatic alternative that embraces tools from the social sciences, political philosophy, and conflict negotiation in service of this alternative. Two critical points are worth raising, however. First, I would argue that a cognitive division of labor is needed among this new school of philosophers. Distinguish those who are best at thinking about questions on the nature and objectivity of value from those who are best at thinking about how to evaluate novel moral challenges (e.g., assisted migration) in light of our best normative theories and from others who are best at working in interdisciplinary policy contexts and scientific working groups, providing valuable assistance in the articulation and evaluation of moral aspects of environmental decisionmaking. Of course, some philosophers can seamlessly move among all these areas, but we need not all be doing the same thing. Second, one can endorse a more pragmatic approach and still reject Dewey's particularism. Environmental ethics could embody and pursue a policy that is both relevant and independent of the tradition of American pragmatism.
These criticisms notwithstanding, Minteer's book is an important defense of environmental pragmatism and deserves a wide readership. Neopragmatist Richard Rorty once wrote, "Truth is what your contemporaries
